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COMMENTS ON PELTZMAN, "THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE DECLINE
OF AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION"*
DAVID D. FRIEDMAN
University of Chicago
I. A PROBLEM
PELTZMAN uses interstate data to explain changes in school perfor-
mance, concentrating on variables that affect the political system control-
ling the schools. There is a serious risk that such a procedure may pro-
duce false positives. It is well established that the family background
of students is a major determinant, perhaps the major determinant, of
performance. Variables describing family background by state are likely
to correlate with other state variables, including the sort Peltzman is
interested in. Results that appear to show the influence of unionization,
or centralization of school financing, or the needs of employers may
merely mean that those variables are serving as proxies for environmental
variables.
This is a familiar problem in statistics, and one for which multiple
regressions are a common solution, but it is particularly serious here
for two reasons. The first is that there is some reason to suspect that
environmental variables may be much more powerful determinants of the
dependent variable than political variables. The second is that it is unclear
what environmental variables at what dates should be controlled for. A
graduating senior has spent twelve years in the school system and eigh-
teen in his family. If, as some would argue, it is early childhood develop-
ment that determines later performance, the relevant environmental vari-
ables may enter with lags of well over a decade. Peltzman attempted to
control for environmental effects by adding several environmental vari-
* Presented at the John M. Olin Centennial Conference in Law and Economics at the
University of Chicago Law School, Chicago, April 7-9, 1992.
[Journal of Law & Economics, vol. XXXVI (April 1993)]
© 1993 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-2186/93/3601-0015$01.50
HeinOnline  -- 36 J.L. & Econ. 371 1993
THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
TABLE I
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF SOME ADDITIONAL VARIABLES
SCHOOL
PERFORMANCE
1972-81 1981-89 DBRK FAM80 FAM60 INC70/60 CONS
1. DBRK .141 - .225 1.000
2. FAM80 - .546 -. 144 - .445 1.000
3. FAM60 -. 508 -. 307 .171 .806 1.000
4. Inc70/60 .359 .282 -.441 -.404 -.736 1.000
5. Cons .311 .314 -.367 -.295 -.567 .513 1.000
6. pnea .114 -.263 .444 .142 .450 -.462 -.467
7. paft -. 193 -.260 .544 -.082 .269 -.209 -.522
NoTE.-See text for definition of variables.
ables to his regressions and found that they did not have much effect on
the results, but that may mean only that he did not try the right ones. In
order to explore this possibility, I experimented with a number of addi-
tional variables.
Table 1 shows part of a correlation matrix relating Peltzman's measure
of performance growth, his union variables, and a number of variables
relevant to student backgrounds.'
The most striking result appears on lines 2 and 3. The variables FAM80
and FAM60 show the percentage of children under age eighteen from
broken homes in 1980 and 1960, respectively. Either variable, by itself,
fits changes in school performance from 1972 to 1981 with a correlation
coefficient greater than .5. The variable DBRK, the change in the percent-
age of children from broken homes from 1960 to 1980, correlates much
more weakly with school performance-and with the wrong sign.
We would expect broken families to result in worse educational out-
comes, but why is it the level rather than the change that is significant?
One possible explanation is long time lags; the level in 1960 may be a
proxy for changes prior to that date whose effect shows itself in students
graduating in the seventies. A second answer is that we may be observing
the combined effect of a family variable and a change in the schools.
Charles Murray, in Losing Ground,2 argues that one of the problems with
the educational system during the sixties and seventies was a shift of
attention from the best to the worst students. If so, we might expect
states where there were a lot of problem students, because of a high
t The variables FAM60, FAM80, pnea, and paft and the school performance variables
are from Peltzman's data, to which he kindly permitted me access.
2 Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980 (1984).
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TABLE 2
RELATIVE TEST SCORE CHANGES: STATES, 1972-81
R 2 = 56.6% R 2 (adjusted) = 49.5%
s = 1.160 with 44 - 7 = 37 degrees of freedom
Variable Coefficient t-ratio
Constant 4.15424 .754
"Real" expenditure per pupil, 1961-81 2.60635 1.25
pnea 2.77758 3.46
paft -5.03255 -2.99
FAM80 -14.1430 -2.89
RIn70/60 3.36275 1.62
Enrollment per district 78/57 -. 110184 -1.61
NOTE.-See text for definition of variables.
level of broken families, to have a particular sharp decline in educational
performance over that period.
In addition to FAM80 and FAM60, other variables that correlate more
strongly with school performance from 1972 to 1981 than do Peltzman's
union variables are Inc70/60 (the percentage growth in real per capita
income from 1960 to 1970) and Cons (the sum of the Republican vote
percentages in the presidential elections of 1964 and 1972).
In order to see whether these variables might explain away Peltzman's
results, I reran several of his regressions, including various selections of
these additional variables. Table 2 shows the result of one such regres-
sion, corresponding to Peltzman's table 5, regression 3, with a few
changes. The main effect of the added variables was to sizably increase
K2 from .29 in regression 3 on Peltzman's table 5 to .495 for the regres-
sion shown in Table 2 above.3 Although adding additional variables weak-
ened the significance of some existing variables and increased that of
others, the general pattern remained the same, suggesting that Peltzman's
results are reasonably robust-although there is always the possibility
that they would be eliminated by the inclusion of some other environmen-
tal variable that neither he nor I have tried.
An alternative approach to avoiding confusion between the effects of
political and environmental variables would be to find political variables
3 The dependent variable, as in Peltzman's table 5, is the coefficient of regression of
average test scores on time, 1972-81. Enrollment per district 78/57 is my measure of changes
in enrollment per school district, discussed infra. Its inclusion tends to weaken or eliminate
the significance of the change in the state government share of public school expenditure,
as one might expect, since they are both measures of the shift toward centralization. Simi-
larly, the inclusion of Cons, my measure of how conservative a state is politically, tends
to weaken the significance of Peltzman's Teacher's Bargaining Rights Law Index (1972).
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that we have good reason to believe are independent of environmental
variables-ideally, political outcomes that are the result of random
causes. I have one suggestion along those lines. We would expect elec-
toral results to correlate in a continuous fashion with population charac-
teristics such as income, education, or family structure; as certain charac-
teristics become more common, vote totals for one party or ideology
should change accordingly. Political outcomes, however, depend on elec-
toral outcomes in a highly discontinuous fashion. While any change in a
party's vote total affects its political strength, the increase from 49.9
percent to 50.1 percent has a much larger effect than an increase from
50.1 percent to 50.3 percent.
This suggests that one could distinguish the political outcome from the
electoral outcome in a regression by including one variable for percentage
of votes by one party and a second showing the number of years during
which that party held the governorship. The first variable should pick up
effects associated with nonpolitical variables that correlate with voting
patterns, making the second a reasonably good measure of the conse-
quences of different political outcomes.
II. AN ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL EXPLANATION
Peltzman discusses a variety of possible causes for the decline in Amer-
ican schooling, but his fundamental model is one in which the change is
due to a change in the power or objectives of the interest groups influenc-
ing the political institutions that control the schools. While I agree with
the underlying idea of looking for an explanation based on the behavior
of those institutions, I would like to suggest a slightly different ap-
proach-one based not on changes in the interest groups but on changes
in the level of government at which the decision is made.
Such changes are important for at least three different reasons. One is
that different levels of government may be subject to different interest
groups with different interests. A firm that is the main employer in a
small town is a highly concentrated interest with regard to the school
board of that town, but part of a rather dispersed interest with regard to
the state legislature and a still more dispersed interest with regard to
Congress, so its influence will be much greater if local school districts
are small and independent.4
A second reason why the level of government matters is that the rele-
vance of the interest group model may depend on the level of govern-
ment. In a naive model of democracy, elected politicians do good things
4 This point is made in Peltzman's article, although it is not central to his argument.
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because that is what the voters who elect them want. This is a poor
description of the working of large governments because of rational igno-
rance; it is rarely worth the cost to an individual voter to discover
whether his elected politicians are acting in his interest and to do some-
thing about it. The result is a political system dominated by concentrated
interest groups. But the naive model may work fairly well for a small town
school board, where parent voters get information about the school's
performance five days a week, at no cost, and where the number of voters
is small enough so that individuals or small groups may hope to have
some influence. If, as seems likely, the individual voter cares more about
the educational quality of the school his children go to than the average
of the interest groups affecting the schools, this effect will tend to produce
a positive correlation between local control of schooling and schooling
quality.
A third reason size matters is that it affects the degree to which govern-
ments compete with each other for taxpayers. In a system where schools
are locally run and funded from local taxes, the resources available to
the local government depend to a substantial degree on how good the
schools are, since many taxpayers decide where to live in part on the
basis of school quality. That provides the local government and the local
school administration with a direct interest in educational quality, quite
aside from political activity by parents or other groups interested in good
schools. This third effect depends on both local control and local funding.
If schools are funded entirely from state taxes, local control may reduce
the problem of rational ignorance among the voters, but it will not give
local school districts any incentive to use educational quality to attract
taxpayers.
All three of these arguments suggest that a movement away from local
control and funding of education might well result in a decline in educa-
tional quality. This seems consistent with our experience. From 1946 to
1974, the number of school districts in the United States fell about sixfold
and the number of students roughly doubled, producing an increase of
more than an order of magnitude in the number of students per school
district. Since 1974 the number of students per school district has been
roughly constant. That pattern fits reasonably well the pattern of educa-
tional outcomes over time. In addition, as Peltzman points out, there was
a substantial shift from local to state funding of schooling over the period
when school performance was declining.
To test the possibility that the increasing size of school districts was
in part responsible for the decline in educational achievement, I ran a
number of regressions using changes in number of school districts or
enrollment per district to fit changes in educational achievement. Using
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the ratio of enrollment per districts in 1978 to enrollment per district in
1957 to fit the change in achievement from 1972 to 1981 gave an R2 of
.181 percent and a t equal to -3.24. The effect was reduced substantially
(t = - 1.67) if I included in the regression a measure of children from
broken homes in 1980-which, as discussed earlier, correlates quite
highly with school performance in the following two decades. The effect
of this measure of changing school district size on changes in achievement
from 1981 to 1989 was not significant. Adding this variable to regression
3 reported in Peltzman's table 5 reduced the significance of his measure
of school centralization (the roll of state funding), as would be expected,
but did not eliminate the significance of his other variables.
These results may well underestimate the importance of increasing size
of districts, due to a problem with the data. It is easy to calculate the
ratio of enrollment to number of school districts in a state, which is what
I did. But this gives an average over districts, not over students; it tells
us how many students the average district has but not how large a district
the average student is in. A state with one district containing a million
students and one containing a thousand appears, by this measure, to have
an average of 500,500 students per district. But in such a state, 99.9
percent of the students are in a million-student district; district size aver-
aged over students is 999,002 students per district.
How serious, in practice, is the distortion that results from averaging
over districts rather than over students? For the state of California for
1977-78, I was able to obtain enough information on individual districts
to calculate an approximate answer to that question. Averaged over dis-
tricts, the figure was about four thousand students per district. Averaged
over students it was over eighty thousand. If such differences are typical,
and if they vary significantly from state to state, they introduce a large
element of noise into my regression. This suggests that it would be worth
trying to calculate, for each state, the figure averaged over students and
seeing whether that statistic predicts school performance even better than
the statistic I measured.
III. MISPLACED SKEPTICISM
The following summarizes an argument Peltzman makes for skepticism
with regard to the evidence that "resources do not matter."
If the marginal return of expenditure on educational achievement is
independent of the student's background, and if the utility function being
maximized by the government has declining marginal utility of student
achievement, the government will tend to allocate more money to stu-
dents with worse backgrounds, although not enough more to bring their
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achievement up to the level of those with better backgrounds. Unmeas-
ured background characteristics will then correlate positively with
achievement and negatively with expenditure, creating the illusion of a
negative correlation between expenditure and achievement. The fictitious
negative correlation may cancel out a real positive correlation, making it
look as though expenditure has no effect on achievement.
The problem with this argument is that it proves too much. If we substi-
tute the employer's utility function for the government's, it implies that
employers typically invest more money training their less able employ-
ees. If we substitute the parent's utility function, it implies that poor but
aspiring parents scrimp to provide additional education to their least able
children. If we substitute the utility function of the political structure
controlling state higher education, it implies that the state universities
admit from the bottom instead of the top of the distribution of graduating
seniors and specialize in remedial rather than advanced education. Casual
observation suggests, in each case, the opposite pattern. That implies
either that the marginal return is higher for expenditures on abler students
or that utility functions for educational achievement exhibit increasing
marginal utility in the relevant range.
If this conclusion is correct, the argument Peltzman offers works in
reverse. Expenditures will tend to be higher, not lower, on students with
better backgrounds. Unobserved variation in background will correlate
positively with both expenditure and achievement, creating the illusion
of a positive correlation between expenditure and achievement. The mea-
sured correlation will then overstate the actual correlation. If, as Peltz-
man reports, the observed correlation is negligible, this argument
strengthens the conclusion that resources do not matter-or converts it
to the even stronger conclusion that increases in resources reduce
achievement.
IV. MARGINAL EMPLOYERS
Peltzman finds that an increase in the skill level of employees of indus-
tries concentrated in a state correlates negatively with changes in educa-
tional quality. I find this result less surprising than he does, for two
reasons. One of them he discusses. A local industry that hires workers
directly out of high school will be more interested in the quality of local
education than one that hires college graduates since a larger fraction of
its employees will be graduates of the local school system.
The second reason is more complicated. During the sixties and seven-
ties, the percentage of college-educated workers was rising, but the frac-
tion of the population going to college was roughly constant. The explana-
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tion of this apparent paradox is that the fraction of the population
graduating from college was much higher in this period than in preceding
decades. The effects Peltzman is looking for depend on changes in the
skill level of new hires, but the variable he constructs measures changes
in the skill level of the entire work force. A firm for which college gradu-
ates made up 8 percent of the work force at the beginning of the period
but 25 percent of new hires (roughly the average figures for the adult
population at the time) would report a steadily rising skill level, even if
the skill level of new hires remained unchanged throughout the period.
So industries that Peltzman interprets as having a rising share of
college-educated hires may simply be ones that started the period with a
work force that contained few college graduates and had a larger but
constant fraction of college graduates as new hires during the period.
Such industries would have been a political force in favor of good local
schools at the beginning of the period. By the end of the period the shift
away from local control of education would have substantially reduced
their influence, quite aside from any change in the composition of the
industry's work force or new hires. This provides a second possible ex-
planation for the negative correlation between skill level of industry and
quality of schooling.
V. CONCLUSION
This article makes a good start on the project of using interstate varia-
tion to explain the change in school performance on the basis of changes
affecting the political institutions that control American schools and pro-
duces some suggestive results. The main improvements I would suggest
are a greater effort to find and control for the relevant nonpolitical vari-
ables, and a more careful examination of the possibility that the drastic
centralization of control and financing of the schools during the postwar
period may have been one of the crucial political changes responsible for
the decline in school performance.
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